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Dobson​ ​1 
Missing​ ​the​ ​Mark:  
Exploring​ ​the​ ​Forgetting​ ​of​ ​Disability​ ​in​ ​Media 
Emily​ ​Dobson,​ ​University​ ​of​ ​Windsor 
 
A common concern within the disability community are the ways in which negative or              
misguided representations in media produce stigma. Stigma can be broadly defined to include             
“problems of knowledge (ignorance), problems of attitudes (prejudice), and problems of           
behaviour (discrimination),” which means that inadequate or unrealistic representations can          
cause a variety of damaging effects . In ​Narrative Prosthesis​, David T. Mitchell and Sharon L.               1
Snyder explore the many ways in which a broad selection of literature has represented disability               
as a literary device, rather than an identity. They state that in the process “disabled people's                
marginalization has occurred in the midst of a perpetual circulation of their images.” Despite an               2
ever growing number of examples of disability in media, the public, and especially many              
scholars, have forgotten about how many representations actually exist: “a social erasure has             
been performed even as a representational repertoire has evolved” . This forgetting has serious             3
consequences, not only on the way disability is socially received, but in framing accessibility              
problems​ ​as​ ​either​ ​non-existent​ ​or​ ​not​ ​as​ ​something​ ​in​ ​need​ ​of​ ​significant​ ​change  
In this way, a critical look at representations of disability is needed in order to not only                 
combat stigma, but to bring disability issues to the forefront of social and political consideration.               
Using Letitia Meynell’s model of pictures as epistemic devices and Nancy Tuana’s exploration             
of Wilful Ignorance in the women’s health movement, I will argue that the social forgetting that                
occurs in spite of the numerous examples in media is due to the outcomes of those                
representations. In addition, I will suggest that discussion of Wilful Ignorance should take             
1​ ​Thornicroft,​ ​Rose,​ ​Kassam,​ ​Sartorius​ ​p.​ ​1 
2​ ​Mitchell​ ​and​ ​Snyder​ ​p.​ ​6 
3 ​ ​Ibid. 
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disability examples into account going forward within the field of Agnotology. When the             
purpose of a disabled character as a literary device is ultimately to remove or cure the disability                 
itself, it is not surprising that the public ultimately forgets that there was a disabled person there                 
at​ ​all. 
Implications​ ​of​ ​Absence:​ ​Meynell’s​ ​Pictures​ ​as​ ​Epistemic​ ​Devices 
In her work “Pictures, Pluralism, and Feminist Epistemology: Lessons from “Coming to            
Understand”,” Letitia Meynell strengthens Nancy Tuana’s argument in “Coming to Understand”           
by outlining a model by which we can perceive and criticize pictorial representations. Meynell’s              
main criticism of Tuana’s account of the history of excluding or trivializing the female clitoris in                
anatomical illustrations is that Tuana’s analysis “lacks grounds for understanding why she should             
be persuaded by these pictures” and suggests “that pictures can be powerful epistemic devices              
for mediating the interplay between epistemic object and subject and for negotiating the role of               
the​ ​community​ ​in​ ​the​ ​production​ ​and​ ​retention​ ​of​ ​knowledge” .  4
Mediums for any given form of media or type of communication comes with specific              
trends and constraints, which influence the final outcome of the media. In anatomical             
illustrations, different viewpoints or perspectives, being, for example, internal versus external           
components of the genitalia, will dictate which aspects of the genitalia get depicted or excluded.               
While it is potentially acceptable for certain aspects or components to be removed because of               
“the limitations of the medium, technique, and view” . She maintains that when something is              5
deemed to be significant for inclusion, “the conventions governing the views and drawing             
systems of medical illustration are sufficiently flexible” in order to allow for their inclusion, or a                
4 ​ ​Meynell​ ​p.​ ​2 
5 ​ ​Meynell​ ​p.​ ​11 
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different drawing system is chosen instead . We can also critically examine how the interests of               6
the audience, illustrator, and client compound to influence the overall outcome. Medical            
illustration​ ​in​ ​particular,​ ​according​ ​to​ ​Meynell,​ ​is​ ​dictated​ ​by​ ​three​ ​main​ ​areas  
“where patriarchal conceptions may enter...(1) The peculiarly conceptual nature of          
medical illustration, which allows the preference of conceptual clarity over completeness           
and accuracy…(2) The economic nature of medical illustration…(3) The dependence on           
the​ ​illustrations​ ​of​ ​previous​ ​generations” .  7
 
Illustrators must work within the confines of their mediums and the constraints of their craft,               
which includes what the client’s interests are as well as the conventions of those who have come                 
before​ ​them​ ​within​ ​the​ ​craft​ ​and​ ​have​ ​taught​ ​them​ ​the​ ​trade.  
Just as pictorial representations have particular constraints, viewers themselves fill in           
gaps and bring their own conceptions and interpretations. Meynell explains that when we as              
viewers “look at a visual representation we generate what we might think of as a set of fictional                  
truths about the fictional state of affairs represented...when these pictures are realistic depictions,             
we imagine of ourselves that we are seeing them” . Viewers are aware that what they are seeing                 8
is not the actual thing, but they are inclined to engage in a pretend play where they take on the                    
position needed to relate with what the image is attempting to convey. Even this is partially                
constrained by ““principles of generations,” that dictate what we should imagine...determining           
how one should engage with representations in different genres and in different media” . These              9
principles of generations, brought to the representation both by the illustrator, by using specific              
techniques and approaches, and the viewer, who may or may not understand the medium’s              
constraints and how to interpret the piece (but will inevitably bring his or her own               
6 ​ ​Ibid.  
7 ​ ​Meynell​ ​p.​ ​13 
8 ​ ​Meynell​ ​p.​ ​15 
9 ​ ​Meynell​ ​p.​ ​16 
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interpretations), “inform how the viewer inspects the object [being represented], thus informing            
how she inspects the depiction” . This complicates our analysis because the viewer can either be               10
“unable to apply the right principles” or the “knowers’ different interests may prompt them to               
focus on or order the fictional truths differently” . However, this allows for interpretational             11
flexibility, given that the viewer can also adopt different positions when viewing the pictorial              
representation​ ​even​ ​when​ ​there​ ​is​ ​a​ ​kind​ ​of​ ​prescribed​ ​interpretation​ ​to​ ​it.  
The flexibility in understanding and in ways of constructing pictorial representations           
means that when something is left out of the image, it is not necessarily because of an intent to                   
misrepresent the particular aspect or component of the genitalia or body segment, in the case of                
anatomical illustrations, but an assumption of its lack of importance or significance . Since in              12
the case of medical illustration, what is represented or conveyed, according to Meynell, is a               
causal relation, “the function of separate parts in relation to the function of an entire system” .                13
The image prompts viewers, who are already pretending to be seeing the real thing, to see the                 
aspects represented explicitly as part of a system of relations, and so when an aspect of it is                  
removed or trivialized in the image, it is assumed to be insignificant or unimportant to the                
functional or causal system being displayed. Meynell states this is because the missing aspect or               
“object can have no causal role in a system for spatial and causal relations,” and through this                 
“patriarchal norms...can dictate what is deemed important in the conceptual visual hierarchy” .            14
Hence the clitoris is excluded because it is seen as unimportant to the reproductive system, and                
the​ ​female​ ​sexual​ ​function​ ​system​ ​is​ ​ignored​ ​altogether.  
10 ​ ​Meynell​ ​p.​ ​17 
11 ​ ​Ibid.  
12 ​ ​Meynell​ ​p.​ ​20 
13 ​ ​Meynell​ ​p.​ ​21 
14 ​ ​Meynell​ ​p.​ ​22 
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In contrast, feminist approaches to medical illustrations indicate “that sexual anatomy is            
connected to reproductive anatomy intimately, but is far from reducible to it” . Feminist             15
illustrations also allow for genitalia to be depicted on a spectrum, which accounts for and               
normalizes intersexuality, since the dichotomy expressed in medical textbooks of purely           
standard-male and standard-female genitalia makes intersexuality “unimaginable and this         
reinforces its cultural unintelligibility” . The variation in depiction, which, due to the versatility             16
of pictorial representation, allows for approachability for a wide audience, and thus leads to a               
cultural​ ​intelligibility​ ​and​ ​understanding. 
Meynell’s account of the problems with exclusion of important aspects of causal systems             
or functions provides important insight into problems with representation of disability in pictorial             
and text media alike. In these representations, two types of absences or erasure contribute to a                
form of ignorance or forgetting about the representations occurring at all. First, especially in              
visual mediums such as film and video games, the process of accommodating limitation and              
social barriers often lacks crucial mediatory points in depiction. This can lead to an overall               
removal of the social and political dimensions of disability, which in turn leads to resistances               
against disability movements towards social and political action. Second, most narratives in a             
large variety of media, resolve with the disabled character being removed, typically through             
death, or cured; the disability is rarely allowed to exist within the narrative after its resolution,                
and through this process of erasure, what becomes normalized and ingrained is the absence of               
disability itself. The first can be explored most directly with Meynell’s epistemic approach to              
pictorial​ ​representations,​ ​but​ ​the​ ​second​ ​can​ ​also​ ​benefit​ ​from​ ​her​ ​analysis. 
15 ​ ​Ibid.  
16 ​ ​Meynell​ ​p.​ ​23 
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In the first case, the real limitations and the process of navigating a society that erects                
unnecessary barriers, or the very tangible consequences of ignoring those limitations, are left out              
of the use of disability in media. This occurs primarily because disability, instead of being               
explored as part of a character’s identity, is used as a plot device, and the mitigation is not                  
necessary to said plot, but more importantly because it isolates disability by removing it from               
social and political contexts. Mitchell and Snyder state that “physical and cognitive differences             
have been narrated as alien to the normal course of human affairs” in the process of identifying                 
characters with disabilities; “To represent disability is to engage oneself in an encounter with that               
which is believed to be off the map of “recognizable” human experiences” . Part of the way this                 17
is done is by removing mediatory or accomodation points from the depiction. Mitchell and              
Snyder note an example where a wheelchair user has to be moved into a boat . Through a scene                  18
transition,​ ​the​ ​woman​ ​is​ ​somehow​ ​moved,​ ​but​ ​the​ ​process​ ​is​ ​left​ ​out​ ​of​ ​view. 
The problem is not necessarily the transition itself, but the lack of audience knowledge in               
order to fill in the gaps. As Meynell notes, audiences can often extrapolate from what is shown to                  
figure out a general idea of what is going on. This occurs in literature all of the time; writers will                    
use scene transitions to move time along and omit unnecessary details. However, when creators              
do it with cases that are not day-to-day occurrences for most of the audience, they give the                 
audience reasons to skip over the necessity of those moments. Meynell’s analysis of causal              
systems and the viewer’s participation makes it clear here that without the audience knowing              
what exactly is skipped in the transition, they will ignore the transition itself since it is otherwise                 
unintelligible. Given that this process of accommodation and having to negotiate the            
17 ​ ​Mitchell​ ​and​ ​Snyder​ ​p.​ ​5 
18 ​ ​p.​ ​22 
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environment in which the disabled person must navigate is put out of the audience’s minds, they                
do not take with them the necessity, or even the possibility of the need for accommodation in                 
reality. Since representations are inherently both a mirror of reality and, in the case of literature                
and art in general, an indication of the imaginative possibilities of changing said reality, without               
an accurate account of these processes of accommodation, non-disabled audience members           
without close relations to a disabled person will not be able to imagine, much less assist in, said                  
processes. 
This is also why the removal of disability itself repeatedly in media representation             
becomes a major problem, particularly in the audience forgetting its very existence. Disability is              
used in media as a way of grounding abstract ideas in something tangible; the bodies of disabled                 
characters give embodied meaning to the problems the narrative is attempting to address, and in               
the process of removing the problem, the creator must also remove the disability in some way.                19
Mitchell and Snyder state that “narrative approaches disability as a wound in need of addressing,               
and thus the narrative act completed only to the extent that the breach is healed and a disruptive                  
anomaly is concealed” . The resolution of the text can only come about with the “resolution” of                20
the disabled character. Insofar as the story concludes without the disability, the audience cannot              
take with it the lasting impression of the disabled character, or even the possibility of said                
character’s​ ​extension​ ​beyond​ ​the​ ​scope​ ​of​ ​the​ ​narrative.  
Removing​ ​of​ ​Discomfort:​ ​Fear​ ​of​ ​Vulnerability​ ​and​ ​Wilful​ ​Ignorance 
I believe the desire to forget disability in media can be explained using Nancy Tuana’s               
conception of Wilful Ignorance in her essay “The Speculum of Ignorance: The Women’s Health              
19 ​ ​p.​ ​62 
20 ​ ​P.​ ​164 
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Movement and Epistemologies of Ignorance.” Though Tuana’s account focuses on specific           
examples from the women’s health movement, it can highlight the self-deception that occurs,             
typically with non-disabled persons, out fear of vulnerability and limitation. This fear uses             
Wilful Ignorance as a coping mechanism, and in doing so must justify cases of vulnerability and                
disability​ ​as​ ​isolated,​ ​socially-removed​ ​cases.  
Tuana’s discussion notes the active maintenance Wilful Ignorance in social systems in            
order to perpetuate, in particular, racism. This form of ignorance is not a mere passive lack of                 
knowing, but an active lack of knowing and of not wanting to know . Ignorance in this case is                  21
both determined by acts of individuals as well as their negligence; it is not passive, and often it is                   
there to maintain strongly held beliefs about a privileged conception of reality. In her discussion,               
Tuana notes that Elizabeth Spelman argues that Wilful Ignorance is “an achievement that must              
be managed” . It is a desire for the facts of systematic racism, in this case, to be false, “coupled                   22
by a fear that they are not, but where the consequences of their being true are so high, it is better                     
to cultivate ignorance” . Ignorance here allows for individuals to be committed to the facts              23
being false without actually believing them to be false, since the act of believing here would                
entail​ ​the​ ​possibility​ ​that​ ​the​ ​facts​ ​are​ ​true. 
Wilful Ignorance is not confined to individuals deceiving themselves, but it “is a             
systematic process of self-deception” that affects those in privileged positions where they can             
ignore the exploitation and their own role in its perpetuation. In regards to the women’s health                
movement, Tuana notes the “widespread involuntary sterilization of women of colour and            
disabled women was one instance of exploitation that [the movement] sought to reveal…[while]             
21 ​ ​Tuana​ ​p.10 
22 ​ ​Tuana​ ​p.​ ​11 
23 ​ ​Ibid. 
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white and able-bodied women were requesting voluntary sterilization” . Efforts attempting to           24
reveal the involuntary sterilization were met, according to Tuana, with “defensive denial” while             
white women seeking voluntary sterilization were not very successful . Even social movements            25
often ignore or remain ignorant of the oppression of other minority groups while working to               
change their own positions. It is not necessarily a malicious intent as much as it is a self-denial of                   
the situations of other that may be perceived as negatively impacting the efforts of certain social                
movements​ ​as​ ​well​ ​as,​ ​in​ ​the​ ​case​ ​of​ ​disability,​ ​a​ ​discomfort​ ​that​ ​some​ ​are​ ​unable​ ​to​ ​deal​ ​with. 
The forgetting of disability representation existing in media, as well as the need to              
remove disability within that media is part of “a systematic process of self-deception” that arises               
out of a desire for the reality of disabled persons to be either not the case, or isolated cases. It                    
stems from a fear of vulnerability and limitation, and this fear prompts people, in denial of the                 
fragility and finitude of living beings, which includes humanity, to assume that situations such as               
disability will not happen to them. These cases are then seen as isolated, or due to the fault of the                    
disabled person. This ignores the very real relational nature of disability, being a product of a                
myriad​ ​of​ ​different​ ​social​ ​structures​ ​interacting​ ​with​ ​a​ ​real​ ​limitation​ ​or​ ​impairment.  
Mitchell and Snyder note that “Kriegel and Longmore argued in tandem that disability             
portrayals could be understood as cathartic revenge by the stigmatizers, who punish the             
stigmatized to alleviate their own worries about bodily vulnerability and inhumane social            
conditions” . Part of the narration of the disability in media, the story told about disability, is                26
one that attempts to bring deviation and “the body’s unruliness under control” . Disability is              27
24 ​ ​Tuana​ ​p.11 
25 ​ ​p.12  
26 ​ ​Mitchell​ ​and​ ​Snyder​ ​p.​ ​19 
27 ​ ​P.​ ​6 
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something that within the narrative must be overcome ​by the disabled person or put out from                
sight in some way. While not all representations fall into negative portrayals or stem from               
malicious intent, disability is even left out of accounts of the success of disabled creators. As                
Leonard Davis states “successful disabled people...have their disability erased by the success” .            28
Alexander Pope, Lord Byron, Milton, are all examples of successful and wide-reaching writers             
that have had their disabilities ‘overlooked’ in a sense because of their success, and in turn the                 
influence​ ​of​ ​their​ ​disability​ ​on​ ​their​ ​work​ ​has​ ​been​ ​ignored.  
Fears about vulnerability and limitation are easily pacified by seeing instances of it cured              
or removed, as well as when the instances themselves seem far removed from actual social and                
political contexts. Wilful Ignorance, then, helps to explain the motivation behind many of these              
removals or curing of disability in the media. It is easier, and maintains someone’s understanding               
of reality, to not have to face real examples of limitation and vulnerability. At the same time,                 
disability in media becomes a spectacle, something that is often kept private now out-in-the-open              
and on display, which is in part what draws an audience. However, the narrative of any media                 
that depicts disability must end with the disability being removed or cured in order to give the                 
audience a sense of relief and resolution. Thus, despite the available resources on disability to               
inform better representations, the not wanting to know, as well as the satisfaction that comes               
from seeing fears put out of potential personal harm, allows for a continuation of Wilful               
Ignorance and allows the minds of most audience members to put disability out of their               
conceptions​ ​of​ ​reality.  
Academic​ ​Forgetting​ ​Through​ ​Exclusion​ ​and​ ​Distancing 
28 ​ ​Qrd.​ ​Mitchell​ ​and​ ​Snyder​ ​p.​ ​30 
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Shelley Tremain in her work “Knowing Disability, Differently” argues that, “exceptions           
notwithstanding, the apparatus (dispositif) of disability continues to be left out of feminist and              
other critical philosophical analyses” . Specifically, philosophical and academic fields “do not           29
consider how disability conditions what they examine, how they examine what they examine,             
nor why they examine what they examine” which in turn maintains a form of epistemological               
ignorance within the “discussions of epistemological ignorance themselves” . Her discussion          30
looks at the ways in which Fricker and Medina individually attempt to use epistemological              
frameworks of ignorance to analyze the trial of Robinson in ​How to Kill a Mockingbird and                
critiques the way in which neither philosopher accounts for disability in their analysis. While              
Tremain’s own analysis of ​Mockingbird provides crucial insight into the testimonial injustice            
that Robinson faces, she provides a breakdown of what she believes an improved intersectional              
analysis​ ​ought​ ​to​ ​look​ ​at: 
“...(1) how the constitution of elements of the apparatus of disability is inextricably             
interwoven with the constitution of social identities that other apparatuses of power            
produce and thus contributes to their constitution; (2) how the apparatus of disability is              
constituted by and through these other identities categories; and, in addition (3) how             
credibility assessments are conferred and withheld on the basis of the proximity of these              
identity categories to a conception of normality and hence contribute to the mechanism of              
normalization​ ​that​ ​the​ ​apparatus​ ​of​ ​disability​ ​produces.”  31
For the purpose of this essay, Tremain’s breakdown is sufficient in showing that the inclusion of                
disability in academic analysis is highly possible, and the lack of inclusion itself ignores              
important​ ​components​ ​of​ ​intersectionality.  
The lack of inclusion, however, can be accounted for by Mitchell and Snyder’s             
discussion on the separation of disability from early social movements. They state that “As              
29 ​ ​Tremain​ ​p.1 
30 ​ ​Ibid.  
31 ​ ​Tremain​ ​p.​ ​6 
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feminist, race, and sexuality studies sought to unmoor their identities from debilitating physical             
and cognitive associations, they inevitably positioned disability as the “real” limitation from            
which they must escape” . In redefining the “gendered, racial, and sexual differences as             32
textually produced,” these movements distanced themselves “from the “real” of physical or            
cognitive aberrancy projected onto their figures” . This created a divide between disability and             33
other marginalized groups, since to be disabled became the “real” deviancy or problem to be               
fixed. Disability communities also played a part in this division, creating false hierarchies where              
those who could “pass” as able-bodied, or could be made to appear passable through the use of                 
prosthetics, would rank higher than those who could not because of them having physical or               
cognitive disability that could not be made tolerable . As Mitchell and Snyder state, “the “real”               34
stigma of a disability deforms the otherwise evident value of gender and race as cultural               
differences” .  35
This separation is, in part, perpetuated by literature which often uses disability as a way               
of making a character stand out “but this exceptionality divorces him or her from a shared social                 
identity” . Disregarding and actively distinguishing disability as not a legitimate cultural          36
difference, these beliefs from early social movements have continued to be perpetuated            
implicitly, seemingly, in both media and academic disciplines. Tremain notes that the disregard             
for disability studies and scholars “is starkly evident in the abundance of ableist metaphors” that               
they use , and Mitchell and Snyder have made it clear that “while stories to rely upon the                 37
32 ​ ​Mitchell​ ​and​ ​Snyder​ ​p.​ ​2 
33 ​ ​p.​ ​3 
34 ​ ​Ibid.  
35 ​ ​p.​ ​33 
36 ​ ​P.​ ​55 
37 ​ ​Tremain​ ​p.​ ​1 
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potency of disability as a symbolic figure, they rarely take up disability as an experience of                
social​ ​or​ ​political​ ​dimensions” .  38
While Tuana accounts for disability in her examples of Wilful Ignorance, she primarily             
leaves this example unexplained and does not use further examples of disability to influence her               
Taxonomy of Ignorance overall. In addition, her initial defining of Wilful Ignorance is situated in               
sources that look only at race. As Mitchell and Snyder point out, what makes disability distinct                
from other minority marks, is its “unambiguous ability to impact every other identity category at               
any time,” but it continues to remain “unrecognized as a form of cultural alliance in academia                
and in public life” . This follows closely with Tremain’s account of the lack of academic               39
analysis that takes disability scholars and studies into consideration in their work. Due to the               
nature of disability, it intersects with every other identity category, making it often integral to the                
full understanding of the situations in which marginalized folks find themselves in. Since, as              
Mitchell and Snyder note, “the ​interdependency ​of disability living constitutes an important            
factor in achieved independence” and that academic research itself is also inherently            
interdependent in character, absence of a regard for disability in any philosophical or academic              40
analysis that looks at marginalized groups overall not only makes the analysis incomplete, it              
denies the important overlaps and interdependencies that occur in these groups as well as in               
academia itself. Thus Tuana’s Wilful Ignorance and her Taxonomy of Ignorance would benefit             
from a more explicit look at disability when going forward within discussions on ignorance.              
Perhaps this is not a task for Tuana herself, but using her concepts as a starting ground for a                   
fuller​ ​taxonomy​ ​of​ ​ignorance,​ ​others​ ​ought​ ​to​ ​take​ ​disability​ ​into​ ​further​ ​consideration.  
38 ​ ​Mitchell​ ​and​ ​Snyder​ ​p.​ ​48 
39 ​ ​p.​ ​x 
40 ​ ​Ibid. 
 
 
 
Dobson​ ​14 
Tremain maintains that as “long as philosophers of social epistemology continue to            
exclude consideration of the apparatus of disability from their work, the critical scope, political              
integrity, and transformative potential of this work will remain limited.” It is necessary that              41
disability be realized “as a category of human difference that cannot be absorbed into a               
homogenizing scheme of a people's shared attributes” within academic discourses as well as             42
media. Mitchell and Snyder maintain that since “disability is the product of an interaction              
between individual differences and social environments...then the contrast between discourses of           
disability situates art and literature as necessary to reconstructing the dynamics of this historical              
interaction” . Given this, literature should also be seriously considered in the study of             43
epistemological​ ​ignorance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 ​ ​Tremain​ ​p.8 
42 ​ ​Mitchell​ ​and​ ​Snyder​ ​p.44 
43 ​ ​P.​ ​43 
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